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Review of Philip Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful? (2014) 
 




   
  Philip  Hamburger  has  had  a  vision,  a  dark  vision  of  lawless  and  unchecked 
power.
1 He wants us to see that American administrative law is “unlawful” root-and-
branch, indeed that it is tyrannous -- that we have recreated, in another guise, the world 
of executive “prerogative” that would have obtained if James II had prevailed, and the 
Glorious  Revolution  never  occurred.  Administrative  agencies,  crouched  around  the 
President’s throne, enjoy extralegal or supralegal power;
2 the Environmental Protection 
Agency,  with  its  administrative  rulemaking  and  combined  legislative,  executive  and 
judicial functions, is a modern Star Chamber;
3 Chevron is a craven form of judicially-
licensed executive tyranny,
4 a descendant of the Bloody Assizes. The administrative 
state stands outside, and above, the law.  
But before criticism, there must first come understanding. There is too much in 
this book about Charles I and Chief Justice Coke, about the High Commission and the 
dispensing power. There is not enough about the Administrative Procedure Act, about 
administrative law judges, about the statutes, cases and arguments that rank beginners 
in  the  subject  are  expected  to  learn  and  know.  The  book  makes  crippling  mistakes 
                                                 
* John H. Watson Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Thanks to Ron Levin, Eric Posner and Cass 
Sunstein for helpful comments, and Chris Hampson for excellent research assistance. 
1 PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014). 
2 See id. at 31 (“Just as English monarchs once claimed a prerogative power to make law outside acts of 
Parliament, so too the American executive now claims an administrative power to make law outside acts 
of Congress.”); id. at 51 (“These days, administrative agencies have revived the imposition of extralegal 
interpretation, regulation, and taxing.”). 
3 The book is studded with sentences like these: “Although the Star Chamber’s issuance of regulations 
came to an end with the court itself, administrative regulations have come back to life.  Not merely one 
administrative body, but dozens now issue regulations that constrain the public.”  Id. at 57. 
4 See id. at 316 (“[T]he deference to interpretation is an abandonment of judicial office . . . . [T]hey 
thereby deliberately deny the benefit of judicial power to private parties and abandon the central feature 
of their office as judges.”) 2 
about the administrative law of the United States; it misunderstands what that body of 
law actually holds and how it actually works. As a result the legal critique, launched by 
five-hundred-odd pages of text, falls well wide of the target. 
In  the  first  section,  I’ll  try  to  reconstruct  Hamburger’s  critique,  whose  basic 
ambiguity arises from the fact that Hamburger is impenetrably obscure about what he 
means by “lawful” and “unlawful.” Those terms are only loosely related to the ordinary 
lawyers’ sense. In my view, the best reconstruction is that Hamburger thinks that there 
are deep unwritten principles of Anglo-American constitutional order, derived from the 
views of English common-law judges; departures from those principles are “unlawful.” In 
the second section, I’ll try to show that the book’s arguments are premised on simple, 
material and fatal misunderstandings of what is being criticized, and never do engage 
the common and central arguments offered in defense of the administrative state. In the 
conclusion,  I’ll  consider  a  suggestion
5  that  the  book  is  only  masquerading  as  legal 
theory, and should instead be understood as a different genre altogether -- something 
like  dystopian  constitutional  fiction.  Although  the  suggestion  is  illuminating,  and 
tempting, I don’t think it applies here. 
 
I. Reconstruction 
  Let me very briefly summarize the surface content of the book (I.A.), and then try 
to reconstruct what Hamburger means when he calls administrative law “unlawful” (I.B.). 
 
A. On the Surface 
The  book’s  modus  operandi,  which  gives  it  a  visionary  atmosphere,  is  its 
relentless raising of the stakes about the administrative state and administrative law. If 
Hamburger  is  correct,  it’s  not  just  that  this  or  that  decision  is  wrong,  or  that  the 
“nondelegation  doctrine”  should  be  revived,  or  that  the  combination  of  functions  in 
agencies should receive renewed judicial scrutiny. The usual debates of constitutional 
lawyers are small-bore, fiddling around the edges of the problem -- a far greater and 
                                                 
5  Offered by my colleague Charles Fried, at a conference on the book manuscript at Columbia Law 
School. 3 
darker  problem.
6  If  Hamburger  is  correct,  the  administrative  state  is  a  political 
abomination, an engine of tyranny. “At stake is nothing less than liberty under law.”
7 
  Modern administrative law is a soft form of “absolutism,” Hamburger tells us over 
and  over  again.
8  Indeed  it  is  a  specifically  continental  absolutism,  a  betrayal  of  the 
Anglo-American rule of law and legal liberty that was rooted in the constitutionalism of 
the  common-law  judges  developed  in  the  16th  and  17th  centuries.  In  passages 
reminiscent of Albert Venn Dicey’s alarmism over droit administratif,
9 Hamburger traces 
the  origins  of  administrative  law  to  both  French
10  and  German
11  legal  theory,  most 
importantly  Prussian  Ordnung  or  bureaucratic  ordering  of  an  absolutist  cast.
12 
Administrative law represents the “Prussification” of our society.
13 
In  England,  absolutism  was  the  road  not  taken,  the  path  urged  by  civilian 
lawyers,  influenced  by  Roman  imperial  law.
14  On  that  path  lay  “prerogative”  --  not 
merely  the  “ordinary”  prerogative  within  the  common  law,  namely  the  various  royal 
powers  themselves  recognized  by  common-law  judges,  but  instead  a  far  more 
sweeping  “extraordinary”  prerogative  outside  and  above  the  law.  The  heroes  of  the 
resistance  to  the  imperial  prerogative,  the  Jedi  Knights  of  the  story,  are  first  and 
foremost the English common-law judges.
15 Hamburger also credits the statesmen who 
                                                 
6 According to Hamburger, “[t]he dark possibilities for America were evident already in the nineteenth 
century.” HAMBURGER, supra note 1, at 450. 
7 Id. at 496.  Other dangers of administrative law, according to Hamburger, are the risk of “overwhelm[ing] 
the Constitution,” id. at 493, “evad[ing] a wide range of regular law, adjudication, institutions, processes, 
and rights,” id. at 494, giving rein to the “lust for power outside the law,” id. at 495, generating feelings of 
alienation from government, id. at 498, and allowing the “knowledge class” to “enlarge[] its own power,” 
id. at 503.  Most ominously, Hamburger writes that “the longer this coercion persists, the more one must 
fear that the remedy also will be forceful.”  Id. at 489. 
8 E.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 1, at 6–7; id. at 25–26; id. at 409–17 (discussing the “serious charge” of 
claiming  that  “administrative  law  is  a  form  of  absolute  power”);  id.  at  508  (“Although  it  would  be  an 
exaggeration to denounce administrative power as mere tyranny or despotism, this power is profoundly 
worrisome.  Even soft absolutism or despotism is dangerous.”). 
9 See, e.g., A. V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 370–71 (10th ed. 
1961) (comparing droit administratif to the tyranny of Star Chamber). 
10 See HAMBURGER, supra note 1, at 444 (discussing Jean Bodin). 
11 See id. at 447–50 (discussing von Treitschke, von Jhering, Lorenz von Stein, Rudolph von Gneist, and 
especially Hegel). 
12 See id. at 445–47. 
13 Id. at 505. 
14 See id. at 34 (“[T]he English self-consciously rejected civilian jurisprudence . . . . [which] became a 
vehicle for justifying absolute power.”); id. at 443 (arguing the source of absolute power was an academic 
focus on “Roman-derived canon and civil law” which “threatened English law,” but was checked, inter alia, 
by King Stephen, who “declared Roman law should have no place or at least no authority in England”). 
15 See id. at 45–47 (describing how The Case of Proclamations came before the judges). 4 
opposed James II, invited the invasion of a foreign king, William III, and brought about 
the Glorious Revolution;
16 but he does not adore them the way he adores Chief Justice 
Coke.
17 
What has all this to do with us? Our present embodies the very fate the English 
common-law  judges,  and  the  Parliamentary  statesmen  of  1689,  thought  they  had 
averted.  As  of  2014,  we  have  recreated  the  absolutist  rule  of  imperial  prerogative, 
perhaps in a somewhat softer form (Hamburger equivocates about this
18) or in a milder 
disguise, but with essentially the same results.
19 Liberty is at the mercy of extra-legal 
bureaucratic Ordnung, lightly cloaked in various constitutional and legal fictions about 
delegation and authorization, but substantively the same.
20 
The hallmarks of extralegal absolutism are everywhere to be seen, in the system 
of administrative law created since the Progressive Era. Agencies engage in “extralegal 
legislation,”  meaning  the  issuance  of  binding  general  rules,
21  and  “extralegal 
adjudication,” meaning the issuance of binding orders.
22 Procedurally, agencies wield 
combined  powers  and  functions.  In  contrast  to  a  system  of  separated  powers  and 
specialized  functions,  their  decisions  are  “unspecialized,”
23  “undivided,”
24  and 
“unrepresentative,”
25  among  other  failings.  The  judges,  cravenly,  have  created  an 
“entire jurisprudence of deference”
26 that provides a sinister twist on the ideal of rule 
                                                 
16 See HAMBURGER, supra note 1, at 48. 
17 See id. at 46 (“Coke, however, refused to be bullied.”); id. at 47 (“[King James’ maneuvering] could only 
have given greater resolve to Coke and his colleagues.  The next month they reported back what the king 
did not want to hear.”); id. at 319 (“James I expected his judges literally to bow before him.  But even 
when Chief Justice Coke had to get down on his knees before his king, he refused to defer.  He kept on 
speaking his mind, exercising his independent judgment. . . . Eventually Coke was dismissed for his 
temerity, but his common law understanding of judicial office survived . . . .”). 
18  Compare  id.  at  493  (calling  administrative  law  a  “revival  of  absolute  power,”  a  “consolidated 
governmental power outside and above the law,” which “threatens to overwhelm the Constitution”), with 
id.  at  508  (suggesting  administrative  law  may  more  prudently  be  deemed  only  “soft  absolutism  or 
despotism,” although nonetheless dangerous). 
19 Id. at 494 (“[P]rerogative power has crawled back out of its constitutional grave and come back to life in 
administrative form.”). 
20 Id. at 508 (discussing the German system of Ordnung and the “familiar dangers” of “the order imposed 
by an administrative class”). 
21 Id. at 31–32. 
22 Id. at 129–31. 
23 Id. at 325. 
24 Id. at 347. 
25 Id. at 355. 
26 Id. at 319. 5 
“through  the  law  and  its  courts.”
27  The  jurisprudence  of  deference  amounts  to  “an 
abandonment of judicial office.”
28 
What then is to be done? In a few cursory final sections, Hamburger offers some 
brief suggestions, vague and ill-defined. The main one is that judges should engage in 
an “incremental approach to administrative law,” meaning “step-by-step corrections” that 
will “bring judicial opinions back into line with the law.”
29 (In a moment, I will suggest that 
by “law” here, Hamburger necessarily means law in a substantive and unwritten sense -
- “law” as the deep principles of a common-law Anglo-American constitutional order). 
The resulting pragmatic problems are dismissed in the most cursory fashion imaginable; 
Hamburger  merely  says  that  “[u]ndoubtedly,  in  some  areas  of  law,  concerns  about 
reliance, the living constitution, precedent, and judicial practicalities can be very serious. 
It is far from clear, however, that they are substantial enough to justify absolute power . . 
. .”
30 Hamburger’s interest obviously flags in this section; his passion lies in articulating 




  What exactly does Hamburger’s title mean? Patently, he must be using the word 
law in two different senses to say that a body of “law” is “unlawful.” Others have noted 
that  Hamburger  never  makes  clear  what  exactly  he  intends
32  --  in  a  book  over  six 
hundred pages long. 
Given  his  historical  interests,  the  most  obvious  possibility  is  that  Hamburger 
means to advance an originalist claim: that administrative law is inconsistent with the 
original understanding of the Constitution of 1789. But this has already been done as 
well as it can be,
33 and in any event I don’t believe that’s what Hamburger is getting at.
34 
                                                 
27 Id. at 280. 
28 Id. at 316. 
29 Id. at 491. 
30 Id. at 492. 
31 Compare id. at 491–92, 509–511 (describing some practical responses), with id. at 1–491, 493–509 
(describing the problem). 
32 See Gary Lawson, The Return of the King: The Unsavory Origins of Administrative Law, TEXAS LAW 
REVIEW  (forthcoming  2014)  (manuscript  at  7–15),  available  at 
http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/2014.html. 
33 See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994).  6 
If Hamburger were an originalist in the conventional American sense, he would spend 
far more time on the ordinary meaning of the text as of 1789, and on the ratification 
debates, and far less time on subterranean connections between the Stuart monarchs 
and  German  legal  theory.
35  His  main  interest,  his  intellectual  center  of  gravity,  is 
elsewhere. 
  I think I perceive, through a glass darkly, what Hamburger means by “unlawful.” I 
think -- although the ambiguities and obscurities of the tome make it irreducibly unclear -
- that the key to understanding Hamburger is that he isn’t an ordinary constitutional 
positivist. The main point, for him, isn’t that administrative law is inconsistent with this or 
that  constitutional  clause,  or  even  the  best  overall  interpretation  of  the  Constitution. 
Hamburger is emphatic that “popular and scholarly debates” get off on the wrong foot by 
addressing the problem of administrative law “as if it were merely a flat legal question 
about compliance with the Constitution.”
36 Passages like this one abound: “[T]he legal 
critique of administrative law focuses on the flat question of unconstitutionality, and . . .  
this is not enough. Such an approach reduces administrative law to a question of law 
divorced from the underlying historical experience and thus separated from empirical 
evidence about the dangers [sic].”
37 
Hamburger has, in other words, an historically-grounded but entirely substantive 
and ironically extra-Constitutional vision of the true Anglo-American constitutional order, 
emphatically with a small-c.
38 That vision is rooted in the historical experience of the 
common-law  judges  who  resisted  (or  didn’t  --  I  will  explain  the  qualifier  later)  the 
prerogative  despotism  of  the  Stuarts.  Hamburger’s  deepest  commitment  is  to  this 
common-law version of Anglo-American constitutionalism. It is of secondary interest to 
                                                                                                                                                           
34  Nor  does  Gary  Lawson.    See  Lawson,  supra  note  32  (manuscript  at  11)  (expressing  belief  that 
Hamburger’s argument is not “reducible to strictly constitutional terms”).  
35 See also Lawson, supra note 32 (manuscript at 12) (“[Hamburger’s] point seems to be that there is 
something lawless about administrative governance that goes above and beyond inconsistency with the 
governmental scheme embodied by the federal Constitution.”). 
36 HAMBURGER, supra note 1, at 5. 
37 Id. at 15.  See also id. at 493 (“The danger of prerogative or administrative power . . . arises not simply 
from its unconstitutionality, but more generally from its revival of absolute power.”). 
38 Lawson seems to agree.  See Lawson, supra note 32 (manuscript at 12) (noting Hamburger uses 
“constitutionalism” to refer to “a very broad set of principles that are part of the Anglo-American legal and 
political tradition”). 7 
him whether the written constitutional rules of the United States, as of 1789, correspond 
to that substantive vision.  
Or rather he assumes that they do, quite casually. What makes the book blurry, 
and what makes my reconstruction tentative, is that the book typically elaborates an 
English constitutional principle at some length, and then offers a few brief pages and 
perhaps a few citations to connect up that principle with the American constitution and 
its original understanding.
39 So it is necessarily an exercise of judgment on my part to 
say that the English materials are where the book’s heart lies, as it were. It would not be 
crazy, although I think it would be misleading, to see Hamburger as a conventional 
originalist who just goes very deeply into the English background, and who tends to 
assume, typically without much proof, that the English background transposes directly 
to the American case. 
In the reconstruction I suggest, Hamburger offers a highly stylized constitutional 
vision derived from the English experience, interestingly cross-bred with American high-
school  civics  --  and  also  premised  on  a  desperately  shaky  understanding  of 
administrative law, or so I will argue. In this vision, legislatures hold the exclusive power 
to  “legislate,”  while  judges  exercise  all  “judicial”  power,  and  exercise  independent 
judgment  in  the  sense  that  they  decide  all  legal  questions  for  themselves,  without 
“deference.” As for the executive, its only power is to “execute” the laws, understood 
very narrowly -- basically the power to bring prosecutions and other court proceedings 
to ask judges to enforce statutes. The thing to avoid at all costs is that the executive 
should issue “binding” orders or rules; where that occurs, the executive is necessarily 
exercising  “legislative”  power,  and  has  arrogated  to  itself  “extralegal”  or  “supralegal” 
prerogative, of the sort claimed by James II in his most extravagant moments. 
When Hamburger says administrative law is “unlawful,” this, I think, is  the way to 
understand him. He means, in other words, that American administrative law is out of 
step with the deep substantive principles of the small-c constitutional order of the Anglo-
American legal culture. Administrative law allows the executive to exercise “legislative” 
power by allowing agencies, and the President, to issue “binding” orders and rules, and 
                                                 
39 Take, for example, Hamburger’s discussion of deference.  Compare HAMBURGER, supra note 1, at 285–
91 (discussing English background), with id. at 291–92 (discussing the American Constitution and its 
immediate context).  8 
in that sense allows the agencies a prerogative to act extra-legally or supra-legally, like 
the Court of Star Chamber. I will call this “the reconstructed thesis.” 
 
II. Administrative Law is Lawful 
 
A. Responses 
Now, the reconstructed thesis could fail in one of several ways. One way would 
be that the thesis is simply wrong about what the deep principles of Anglo-American 
constitutional history actually are (assuming arguendo that such principles exist). I’m not 
qualified to judge whether the book offers a fair reading of English constitutional history, 
although I suspect that the story is far more nuanced than Hamburger lets on. On Adam 
Tomkins’ lucid account,
40 the common-law judges failed altogether in their resistance to 
royal prerogative.
41 When in 1638, nine of twelve judges allowed Charles I to levy ship-
money  taxes  in  peacetime,  and  without  statutory  authorization,
42  the  game  was 
essentially  over.  Royal  pretensions  were  eventually  curbed,  but  by  civil  war, 
Parliamentary  resistance,  and  William  III,  not  by  common-law  judges.  Distilled  to  its 
essence, “the reality of the common-law constitution -- and the reason for its failure -- 
was that, as Coke himself explained it in the House of Commons in 1628, ‘in a doubtful 
thing, interpretation always goes for the king.’”
43 Chevron avant la lettre. 
A second way the thesis might fail is that it might have no pragmatic implications 
whatsoever. It would be the easiest thing in the world to dismiss Hamburger’s book with 
the  glib  observation  that  it  will  change  nothing.  If  one  means  by  this  that  the 
administrative state will be essentially unchanged in its large institutional outlines for the 
foreseeable  future,  and  that  administrative  law  will  also,  the  observation  is  certainly 
correct. Hamburger’s main proposal for rolling back the administrative state, step-by-
step judicial correction,
44 verges on self-refutation. Weren’t the American judges who 
decided cases like Chevron the ones who helped get us into this mess in the first place, 
on Hamburger’s view? If they are a large part of the problem, why does he think they 
                                                 
40 ADAM TOMKINS, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION (2005). 
41 See id. at 69-87 (“The Failure of the Common Law Constitution”). 
42 See id. at 84-85.  
43 Id. at 87. 
44 HAMBURGER, supra note 1, at 491. 9 
are also the source of the solution? Hamburger hasn’t thought through the relationship 
between  his  diagnosis  and  his  prescription,  which  are  patently  in  tension  with  one 
another.
45 
Yet I don’t think that the pragmatic dismissal is a fair response to Hamburger. 
That  the  administrative  state  is  going  nowhere  does  not  mean  that  books  like 
Hamburger’s have no effect, or that they can be ignored on pragmatic grounds. The 
effect of such books, if accepted, is to quietly delegitimate the administrative state, to 
tear out its intellectual struts and props while leaving the building itself teetering in place 
-- a dangerous game.
46 The indirect and long-run effect of Hamburger’s thesis on the 
intellectual  culture  of  the  legal  profession,  and  perhaps  even  of  the  broader  public, 
might  be  pernicious  and  worth  opposing,  even  if  there  are  no  direct  and  short-run 
effects. 
So  I  will  not  take  either  the  route  of  disputing  Hamburger’s  account  of 
“lawfulness,” or the route of dismissing his book as ineffectual. However, there is yet 
another, simpler way that the book’s reconstructed thesis might go wrong. It might go 
wrong not in the major premise, about what the deep principles of the (putative) Anglo-
American constitutional order are, but in the minor premise -- about whether American 
administrative law violates those principles, or at least whether Hamburger has shown 
that  it  violates  those  principles.  That’s  the  avenue  I  will  follow.  The  book  is  lite  on 
knowledge of administrative law, fatally so. 
 
B. Why Administrative Law is “Lawful” -- or Not Proven to be “Unlawful” 
  So let me accept Hamburger’s premises, as I’ve tried to reconstruct them, and 
show that even given those premises administrative law is lawful. Or, at a minimum, I 
hope to show that the book hasn’t come close to showing that administrative law is 
“unlawful,” for the simple reason that it hasn’t understood what administrative law says; 
the book veers off-target because it doesn’t know where the target actually is. I’ll sort 
                                                 
45 See generally Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1743, 1788-90 (2013). 
46  See,  e.g.,  HAMBURGER,  supra  note  1,  at  509–511  (advocating  for  changes  in  legal  and  absolutist 
vocabulary under the title “candor”). 10 
the discussion into three main topics: delegation, the taxing power, and the separation 
of powers, including the separation of functions in agencies. 
1. Delegation -- The delegation issue hangs over the whole book. Hamburger’s 
basic  charge,  recall,  is  that  administrative  law  rests  on  “prerogative”  and  is  thus 
“extralegal.” Whatever that means exactly, it would become a far more difficult claim to 
defend  to  the  extent  that  administrative  law  enjoys  valid  statutory  authorization.  If 
administrative agencies exercise whatever powers they possess under the authority of 
valid  statutory  grants,  then  they  act  lawfully  in  the  ordinary  sense.  Now  of  course 
agencies may go wrong in other ways -- for example, they may happen to exercise their 
delegated powers in an arbitrary and capricious manner -- but that is not a wholesale 
problem with the administrative state, and it’s not the sort of wholesale critique of the 
administrative state’s lawfulness that Hamburger wants to offer.  
So  Hamburger  will  have  to  deny  that  the  statutory  authorizations  are  indeed 
otherwise “lawful,” in his special sense. He will have to say that even if the authorizing 
statutes are valid, in the ordinary legal sense, they violate the deep principles of Anglo-
American  constitutionalism.  As  we  will  see,  he  does  say  that  --  on  the  basis  of  an 
argument  that  it  is  predicated  on  a  straightforward  mistake  about  American 
administrative law. 
Let  me  start  with  a  critical  example  of  the  delegation  problem:  Hamburger’s 
treatment  of  Chevron.
47  In  Chapter  Four,  the  main  point  is  that  administrative 
“interpretation”
48  is  a  form  of  “extralegal  lawmaking.”
49  Hamburger  contrasts  two 
approaches, one in which judges decide what the law means in the course of deciding 
cases, and one -- putatively imperialistic, derived from Roman law -- in which the king or 
executive assumes a kind of “prerogative” or “extralegal” power to fill in gaps in the law. 
Hamburger’s target here is Chevron deference to agency interpretations; he wants to 
draw an analogy between Chevron and the more luridly imperialistic pronouncements of 
James II and his servants about the king’s gap-filling authority. “[B]ecause the office of 
                                                 
47 Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
48 HAMBURGER, supra note 1, at 55. 
49 Id. at 57. 11 
judgment belonged to the judges, the king could not interpret with judicial authority, and 
they could not defer to his views.”
50 
In Chapter Sixteen, his central treatment of “deference,” Hamburger makes the 
target explicit. I will quote some passages from his discussion, in part to give the reader 
a  taste  of  the  panoramic,  conceptual,  and  largely  question-begging  flavor  of 
Hamburger’s prose: 
 
The  most  basic  judicial  deference  is  the  deference  to  binding  administrative 
rules. When James I attempted to impose legal duties through his proclamations, 
the [English common-law] judges held this void without showing any deference . . 
. . The English thereby rejected extralegal lawmaking, and in the next century the 
American  people  echoed  the  English  constitutional  response  by  placing  all 
legislative power in Congress. Nonetheless, the courts nowadays defer to the 
executive’s  extralegal  lawmaking.  .  .  .  This  deference  to  the  executive  is 
incompatible with the judicial duty to follow the law.
51 
 
But  what  if  validly-enacted  statutes  themselves  instruct  the  courts  to  defer? 
Legislative  delegation  of  interpretive  authority  to  agencies,  if  otherwise  valid,  would 
square the circle, reconciling the two approaches that Hamburger wants to contrast. If 
the law itself includes a valid delegation of law-interpreting authority to the agencies, 
then faithful judges, independently applying all relevant law in the case at hand, would 
conclude that the agency’s interpretive authority is not extra-legal, but securely intra-
legal. This is of course the delegation theory of Chevron, now reigning as the official 
theory after its adoption by the Supreme Court more than a decade ago.
52  
                                                 
50 Id. at 54. 
51 Id. at 313–14. 
52  See  United  States  v  Mead  Corp.,  533  U.S.  218,  226–27  (2001)  (“We  hold  that  administrative 
implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that 
Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the 
agency  interpretation  claiming  deference  was  promulgated  in  the  exercise  of  that  authority.”).  For 
precursors, see, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000); Smiley v. 
Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1997). 12 
I  hasten  to  add  that  I  think  that  the  delegation  theory  is  an  erroneous  and 
insufficient justification for Chevron, both because it is rankly fictional
53 -- there just is no 
general delegation of that sort to administrative agencies -- and because the Chevron 
opinion  itself  is  irreducibly  ambiguous,  or  ambivalent,  on  the  topic  of  delegation.  At 
some  points  it  endorses  a  version  of  the  delegation  theory.
54  At  others  it  explicitly 
disavows  that  theory,
55  and  instead  rests  deference  on  the  benefits  of  political 
accountability and expertise.
56  
But  the  issue  of  the  correct  justification  for  Chevron  is  irrelevant  for  present 
purposes. All that matters here and now is that the official delegation theory is critical for 
Hamburger, because -- if correct -- it scrambles his categories. Indeed the very point of 
the  delegation  theory  of  Chevron  is  precisely  to  refute  the  charge  that  Chevron  is 
lawless. The point of the theory, right or wrong, is to reconcile the traditional lawyer’s 
conscience with deference to administrative agencies on questions of law. 
  All this is intended to illustrate the centrality of the delegation issue. What then 
does  Hamburger  say  about  delegation?  How  does  he  attempt  to  show  that  the 
authorizing statutes are themselves “unlawful”? With an argument, it turns out, that rests 
                                                 
53 See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretation of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517 
(“In the vast majority of cases I expect that Congress . . . didn’t think about the matter at all.  If I am 
correct in that, then any rule adopted in this field represents merely a fictional, presumed intent, and 
operates principally as a background rule of law against which Congress can legislate.”); City of Arlington, 
Texas  v.  FCC,  133  S.  Ct.  1863,  1868  (2013)  (per  Scalia,  J.)  (“Chevron is  rooted  in  a  background 
presumption  of  congressional  intent:  namely,  "that  Congress,  when  it  left  ambiguity  in  a  statute" 
administered by an agency, "understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the 
agency, and desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the 
ambiguity allows."). 
54 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 (statutory gaps rest on explicit or implicit delegations of law-
interpreting power to agencies). 
55 See Chevron 467 U.S. at 865 (emphasis added): 
 
Congress intended to accommodate both [environmental and economic] interests, but did not do 
so  itself  on  the  level  of  specificity  presented  by  these  cases.  Perhaps  that  body  consciously 
desired  the  Administrator  to  strike  the  balance  at  this  level,  thinking  that  those  with  great 
expertise and charged with responsibility for administering the provision would be in a better 
position  to  do  so;  perhaps  it  simply  did  not  consider  the  question  at  this  level;  and  perhaps 
Congress was unable to forge a coalition on either side of the question, and those on each side 
decided to take their chances with the scheme devised by the agency. For judicial purposes, it 
matters not which of these things occurred. Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of 
either political branch of the Government.  
 
56  Id.  at  865–66  (stressing  the  political  accountability  and  expertise  of  administrative  agencies  in  the 
executive branch). Thanks to Ron Levin for clarifying my thinking about the issues in this paragraph 
(although the views expressed here are mine alone). 13 
on  a  simple  misunderstanding  of  American  administrative  law.  Hamburger’s  major 
charge is that administrative law permits “subdelegation” or “re-delegation” of legislative 
power from Congress to agencies.
57 With the exception of a few asides, to which I will 
return, Hamburger relentlessly, repetitively, urges that when the people have delegated 
legislative power to a certain body (Congress) in the Constitution, subdelegation or re-
delegation of legislative power by that body to another is forbidden, under the old maxim 
delegata potestas non potest delegari.
58 The whole of Chapter Twenty
59 is devoted to 
elaborating this argument. 
  Unfortunately  there  is  no  one,  or  almost  no  one,  on  the  other  side  of  the 
argument. Administrative law is in near-complete agreement
60 with Hamburger on this 
point. The official theory in administrative law is precisely the one Hamburger thinks he 
is offering as a critique of administrative law: namely that Congress is constitutionally 
barred from subdelegating or re-delegating legislative power to agencies. Very oddly, 
Hamburger never cites the main-line of delegation cases that say exactly this, including 
most centrally Loving v. United States,
61 which doesn’t appear in Hamburger’s index.
62 
Loving is explicit about all this: the official theory is that “the lawmaking function belongs 
to Congress and may not be conveyed to another branch or entity.”
63 More recently, in 
City  of  Arlington  v.  FCC,  the  Court  emphatically  reaffirmed  that  legislative  power  is 
“vested exclusively in Congress.”
64 Hamburger’s elaborate proof that subdelegation of 
legislative power is forbidden amounts to pounding on an open door. 
  The difference between Hamburger and the official theory is that administrative 
law  denies  that  there  is  any  delegation  of  legislative  power  at  all,  so  long  as  the 
                                                 
57 See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 1, at 377. 
58 Id. at 386. 
59 Id. at 377–402. 
60 I said that administrative law is in near-complete agreement about the official theory of delegation. The 
qualifier is necessary only because of a few judges here and there, most notably Justice Stevens, who 
have advanced a different, nonstandard theory: that some delegations of “legislative” power are valid, 
while some are not (with the “intelligible principle” test sorting between the two).  See, e.g., Whitman v. 
Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 488–90 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring). But this has never been the 
mainstream  of  American  legal  theory,  as  Stevens  himself  very  candidly  showed,  with  a  long  string 
citation.  See id. at 488 n.1. For a defense of the Stevens view, see Kathryn Watts, Rulemaking as 
Legislating,  Geo  L.J.  (forthcoming),  available  at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2433742 
61 Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996). 
62 HAMBURGER, supra note 1, at 626. 
63 Loving, 517 U.S. at 758 (citation omitted) (citing U.S. CONST., art. I, § 1). 
64 City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1873 n.4 (2013). 14 
legislature has supplied an “intelligible principle”
65 to guide the exercise of delegated 
discretion. Where there is such a principle, the delegatee is exercising executive power, 
not legislative power. As the Court put it in City of Arlington,  
 
[a]gencies  make  rules  ("Private  cattle  may  be  grazed  on  public  lands X, 
Y, and Z subject  to  certain  conditions")  and  conduct  adjudications  ("This 
rancher's  grazing  permit  is  revoked  for  violation  of  the  conditions")  and  have 
done so since the beginning of the Republic. These activities take "legislative" 
and "judicial" forms, but they are exercises of — indeed, under our constitutional 
structure they must be exercises of — the "executive Power."
66 
 
One might think this distinction merely semantic. Nothing could be farther from 
the  truth.  The  distinction  results  from  a  serious,  substantive  view  of  the  nature  of 
executive power, a view worked out in a line of cases beginning, at the latest, with Field 
v. Clark
67 in 1892,
68 and continuing with Grimaud v. United States
69 in 1911 and J.W. 
Hampton v. United States in 1928.
70 On that view, the whole problem of delegation is to 
navigate between Scylla and Charybdis.  
On the one hand, if the only requirement were that the delegatee must act within 
the  bounds  of  the  statutory  authorization  --  the  Youngstown  constraint
71  --  the 
legislature could in effect delegate legislative power to the executive by means of an 
                                                 
65 J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (“If Congress shall lay down by 
legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to fix such rates is directed 
to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.”). 
66 City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1873 n. 4. 
67 Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892). 
68  See  id.  at  692  (“That  Congress  cannot  delegate  legislative  power  to  the  President  is  a  principle 
universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by 
the Constitution.  The act [in question] is not inconsistent with that principle.  It does not, in any real 
sense, invest the President with the power of legislation.”); id. at 694 (“The legislature cannot delegate its 
power to make a law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things 
upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend.  To deny this would be to stop the 
wheels of government”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Commonwealth ex rel. McClain v. Locke 
(Locke’s Appeal), 72 Pa. 491, 498–99 (1873)). 
69 United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 516 (1911) (holding that delegation to Secretary of Agriculture 
to  manage  public  lands  was  not  a  delegation  of  legislative  power  but  a  conferring  of  “administrative 
functions”). 
70 See supra note 65. 
71 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952) (the executive must derive  
authority to act either from an act of Congress or directly from the Constitution). 15 
excessively broad or open-ended authorization. On this view, requiring the agency to 
act within the bounds of the statutory authorization is not enough. Youngstown must be 
supplemented  by  an  additional  standard  --  in  the  rules-and-standards  sense  --  that 
courts  use  as  a  backstop,  to  police  overly  broad  or  vague  statutory  authorizations. 
Excessive breadth or vagueness means that the authorization in effect amounts to a 
delegation of legislative power de facto, even if not de jure.  
On the other hand, the dilemma continues, it would itself be a misunderstanding 
of the constitutional scheme to require the legislature to fill in every detail necessary to 
carry its chosen policies into execution, and to adjust those details as circumstances 
change  over  time.
72  To  require  that  would  equally  confound  legislative  power  with 
executive power, just in the opposite direction. In order to prevent legislative abdication 
to the executive, it would in effect force the legislature to act as the executive itself. The 
“intelligible principle” doctrine steers between these perils, attempting to sort executive 
power to “fill in the details” from legislative power to set the overall direction for policy. 
At this point critics of the administrative state, Hamburger very much included, 
tend to go wrong by assuming that the argument in favor of allowing the executive to fill 
in the details, and against requiring legislatures to handle all the details themselves, is 
all  just  an  argument  from  practicality,  or  expediency,  or  necessity.  It  is  not;  it  is 
emphatically an internal legal and constitutional argument, just as much as any of the 
arguments against delegation. The internal legal argument is that the power to fill in the 
details is an indispensable element of what “executive” power means; that to execute a 
law inevitably entails giving it additional specification, in the course of applying it to real 
problems and cases. 
To be clear, the official theory of delegation in American administrative law is not 
a view that I agree with.
73 The better theory, and indeed the one with better founding-
                                                 
72 See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424 (1944): 
 
The  Constitution  as  a  continuously  operative  charter  of  government  does  not  demand  the 
impossible or the impracticable.  It does not require that Congress find for itself every fact upon 
which it desires to base legislative action or that it make for itself detailed determinations . . . .  
The essentials of the legislative function are the determination of the legislative policy and its 
formulation and promulgation as a defined and binding rule of conduct . . . . 
 
73 See generally Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 1721 (2002). There are a number of excellent response to and critiques of this paper, by Larry 16 
era credentials,
74 is that so long as an agency acts within the boundaries of the statutory 
authorization, obeying the Youngstown constraint, the agency is necessarily exercising 
executive rather than legislative power, intelligible principle or no.
75 But right or wrong, 
the merits of that non-standard view are not relevant here, and the official theory of 
American administrative law is by no means trivially or obviously flawed. Before one 
discards it, one must first understand and respond to it. Hamburger’s main, exhaustive 
argument about delegation simply fails to come to grips with the official theory. 
So  Hamburger  seems  largely  unaware  of  the  true  grounds  of  his  central 
disagreement with American administrative law. The true issue in controversy is not 
whether legislative power can be delegated (all concerned agree that it can’t); the issue 
is whether administrative issuance of “binding” commands, under statutory authority, 
always and necessarily counts as an exercise of “legislative” power. Hamburger would 
have  to  say  that  it  does;  the  main  line  of  American  administrative  law  says  that  it 
doesn’t,  at  least  not  necessarily.  So  long  as  agencies  are  guided  by  an  “intelligible 
principle,” they are exercising executive power, not legislative power, even when they 
issue binding commands. 
In  various  unfocused  remarks,
76  Hamburger  seems  to  recognize  the  problem 
implicitly, and seems to say that officials exercise “legislative” power whenever, and just 
so long as, they issue “binding” commands.
77 This is the argument he needs, and it is 
woefully  underdeveloped.  And  in  any  event,  as  the  Supreme  Court  has  always 
                                                                                                                                                           
Alexander and Sai Prakash, Gary Lawson, and others; the citations are collected in Hamburger’s book, in 
the notes to Chapter 20. 
74 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.73, at 1732–40 (arguing that the 
nondelegation  doctrine  is  unsupported  by  originalist  evidence,  including  original  understanding,  early 
legislation and legislative history, and early judicial decisions). 
75 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.73, at 1725–26 (arguing that any 
rulemaking  engaged  in  by  the  executive  pursuant  to  congressional  authorization  is  a  simple  case  of 
executive power). 
76 See, e.g., Hamburger, supra note 1, at 378 (“The subdelegation problem thus arises primarily where 
Congress authorizes others to make legally binding rules, for this binding rulemaking, by its nature and by 
constitutional grant, is legislative.”) (emphasis added). There are remarks of this sort scattered through 
the book. 
77  For simplicity’s sake, I focus here on rulemaking commands issued by an agency acting as mini-
legislature,  as  distinguished  from  adjudicative  commands  issued  by  an  agency  acting  as  mini-
court.  Hamburger considers the latter ‘unlawful’ also. That conclusion is susceptible to objections that are 
parallel to the arguments that I make in the text regarding agencies’ exercises of ‘legislative’ power in 
rulemaking. (Thanks to Ron Levin for clarifying my thinking here, and for suggesting the formulation in 
this note). 17 
recognized, the argument simply can’t be correct. There are several ways to put the 
problem, which end up at the same place, and have the same cash value.  
One way is in terms of the distinction between “interpretation” and “lawmaking.” 
Hamburger seems to concede, as anyone must, that agencies can interpret statutes in 
the course of their work; he just assumes that in the proper scheme of things, judges 
will review those interpretations without deference, setting them aside freely if they are 
incorrect, in the judges’ independent view. But as others have pointed out,
78 the line 
between “interpretation” and “lawmaking” is hardly self-evident. Are agencies confined 
to parroting the exact language of the statute, or can they add specification? Hamburger 
gives no account of how to distinguish the two. 
Furthermore, such interpretations are themselves “binding” in one straightforward 
sense. Executive officials necessarily and inescapably issue “binding” interpretations, 
just so long as the statute they are charged with applying is binding. Every time a taxing 
authority or customs officer interprets a statute and applies it to a person or firm, the 
interpretation is “binding” in the sense that it provides law for the addressee unless and 
until  overturned  by  a  higher  administrative  tribunal,  or  by  a  judge.  Metaphysically 
speaking, it is the underlying statute rather than the administrative interpretation that 
“binds”; but the interpretation will inevitably add specification to the statute, even if only 
by  applying  it  to  a  new  case.  Speaking  practically  rather  than  metaphysically,  the 
agency interpretation is binding in the sense that it determines the legal position for the 
time being. 
Finally,  the  Supreme  Court  has  never  --  not  once,  not  in  1935,  not  ever  -- 
accepted  Hamburger’s  position  that  every  “binding”  rule  made  by  an  administrative 
agency necessarily represents an exercise of “legislative” power. The Court specifically 
denied this in Grimaud, in 1911, and described administrative rulemaking power as a 
longstanding  principle  of  American  constitutionalism.  It  is  worth  quoting  the  key 
passages: 
 
                                                 
78 See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 32 (manuscript at 28–30) (discussing the difficulties of distinguishing 
cleanly between lawmaking and interpretation). 18 
From the beginning of the Government various acts have been passed conferring 
upon  executive  officers  power  to  make  rules  and  regulations—not  for  the 
government  of  their  departments,  but  for  administering  the  laws  which  did 
govern.  None  of  these  statutes  could  confer  legislative  power.  But  when 
Congress had legislated and indicated its will, it could give to those who were to 
act  under  such  general  provisions  "power  to  fill  up  the  details"  by  the 
establishment of administrative rules and regulations . . . . That “Congress cannot 
delegate legislative power to the President is a principle universally recognized 
as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained 
by  the  Constitution.”  But  the  authority  to  make  administrative  rules  is  not  a 
delegation of legislative power . . . .
79 
 
The point of Grimaud, the theory it embodies, is not to be waved aside. The theory is 
that it is an indispensably executive task to “fill in the details” of statutes with binding 
regulations. That sort of regulation does not compete with legislative power, or displace 
it,  but  complements  and  completes
80  it  --  fulfilling,  not  compromising,  the  system  of 
separated  powers.  Moreover,  Grimaud  claims  that  the  theory  has  been  adopted  in 
American constitutional law from the beginning, as evidenced by unbroken legislative 
and executive practice. It just is part and parcel of the American system of separated 
powers, whatever Chief Justice Coke might have said about it.  
Hamburger  may  disagree  with  that  theory,  or  with  the  historical  claim,  but 
shouldn’t he address them squarely? It isn’t enough to just repeat, and repeat, the claim 
specifically disputed and denied in Grimaud and other leading cases -- the claim that 
“[w]hen Congress authorizes administrative lawmaking, it shifts legislative power to the 
executive.”
81  The  whole  question,  again,  is  whether  authorized  administrative 
rulemaking amounts to “lawmaking” or “legislative power.” In a note,
82 Hamburger says 
                                                 
79 United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517, 521 (1911) (emphasis added) (quoting Field v. Clark, 143 
U.S. 649, 692 (1892)). 
80 See generally Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President’s Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 
2280 (2006) (discussing the President’s authority to “prescribe incidental details needed to carry into 
execution a legislative scheme, even in the absence of any congressional authorization to complete that 
scheme,” id. at 2280). 
81 HAMBURGER, supra note 1, at 428. 
82 Id. at 596 n.3. 19 
that Grimaud should be read narrowly, as a case about regulation on public lands.
83 Of 
course the rationale of the decision is not so confined, but that’s not even the point. 
Where is the positive evidence, in American legal sources, for the view that Hamburger 
wants to describe as a deep constitutional principle -- the view that any and all “binding” 
administrative  regulations  promulgated  under  statutory  authority  count  as  forbidden 
exercises of legislative power? There is none. 
 
2.  Delegation  and  the  Taxing  Power  --  The  same  basic  problem  cripples  the 
book’s treatment of delegation and the taxing power. Hamburger’s discussion illustrates 
the  sheer  strangeness  of  the  book’s  analysis,  its  remoteness  from  American 
constitutional and administrative law. Hamburger acknowledges that “[n]owadays, the 
question about extralegal taxation is not whether there is a prerogative or administrative 
power to tax without statutory authorization, but rather whether the executive can tax 
with  such  authorization.”
84  But  he  insists  that  “in  placing  the  power  to  tax  in  the 
legislature, constitutional law barred it from relinquishing this power.”
85 By “constitutional 
law,” here, Hamburger seems to mean constitutional law in his own sense, the small-c 
constitutionalism propounded by English common-law judges of the 17th century.
86 
The same mistake appears here as in the delegation discussion more generally: 
the theory of administrative law isn’t that Congress delegates its legislative power to tax 
to the executive; the theory is that there has been no such delegation of legislative 
power at all, so long as an intelligible principle exists. But Hamburger clearly appears to 
think that there is some special problem about statutory authorizations of the power to 
impose  taxes.  The  United  States  Supreme  Court,  however,  addressed  this  very 
question  in  1989,  in  Skinner  v.  Mid-America  Pipeline  Co.
87  Rejecting  a  claim  that 
statutory authorization of the taxing power is subject to special, heightened scrutiny, 
                                                 
83 Id. (“[T]he Court [in United States v. Grimaud] was speaking about the rules governing the use of public 
property, and whether it meant more than this [is] far from clear.”). 
84 Id. at 62. 
85 Id. 
86 See id. at 63 (“To repeat the words of Chief Justice Holt, taxes were legislative, and therefore under 
‘the  original  frame  and  constitution  of  the  government,’  they  ‘must  be  by  an  act  made  by  the  whole 
legislative authority.’”) (quoting Brewster v. Kidgell, (1698) 90 Eng. Rep. 1270 (K.B.) 1270; Holt, K.B., 
670). 
87 Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212 (1988). 20 
Skinner examined the text and structure of Article I, and the history of legislation from 
“[Congress’]  earliest  days  to  the  present,”
88  and  found  no  reason  to  treat  taxation 
differently.
89  
Skinner doesn’t appear in Hamburger’s index; one searches the book in vain for 
any trace of it (although I cannot swear it is not lying around somewhere in the vast 
expanse  of  the  book).  Hamburger  seems  to  think  he  can  discuss  American 
administrative law without reading the cases. But knowing what Chief Justice Holt said 
in 1698
  doesn’t necessarily entitle one to pronounce on the administrative law of the 
United  States.  The  system  of  American  administrative  law  is  complex,  and  there  is 
much to be read, and considered, and discussed, by anyone who would venture large-
scale opinions about it.  
 
3.  The  Separation  of  Powers,  and  of  Functions  --  Hamburger  sees  the  main 
virtue of the separation of powers as institutional specialization of functions, which in 
turn  limits  arbitrary  decisionmaking.  The  separation  of  powers  underlying  the  Anglo-
American  constitutional  order  “forc[es]  the  government  to  work  through  specialized 
institutions with specialized powers . . . forcing it to work in a sequence of legislative, 
executive and judicial power.”
90 (Here Hamburger echoes a recent wholesale critique of 
the administrative state by Jeremy Waldron, who also emphasizes the importance of 
sequencing.
91)  The  administrative  state  blatantly  violates  this  principle.  “Rather  than 
follow the Constitution’s orderly stages of decisionmaking, an agency can blend these 
specialized elements together -- as when it legislates through formal adjudication [sic], 
or secures compliance with its adjudicatory demands by threatening severe inspections 
or regulation.”
92 
                                                 
88 Id. at 221. 
89 See id. at 222 (“We find no support, then, for Mid-America’s contention that the text of the Constitution 
or the practices of Congress require the application of a different and stricter nondelegation doctrine in 
cases where Congress delegates discretionary authority to the Executive under its taxing power.”). 
90 HAMBURGER, supra note 1, at 334. 
91 Jeremy Waldron, Separation of Powers in Thought and Practice?, 54 B.C. L. REV. 433, 441 (2013) 
(describing how the separation of powers may be conceived of as giving the legislature an “initiating place 
on the assembly line”).  See also id. at 456 (describing the tripartite division of powers as “phases” in a 
“process”).  For a critique of this view, see Adrian Vermeule, Optimal Abuse of Power, NW. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 18–23). 
92 Hamburger, supra note 1, at 334. 21 
There are at least two independently fatal problems with this treatment. One is 
the  delegation  problem,  in  a  different  form.  The  problem  is  that  the  institutionally-
specialized process of lawmaking that Hamburger likes, with its sequence of legislative, 
executive  and  judicial  action,  is  itself  the  source  of  the  combined  functions  that 
Hamburger abhors.
93 Agencies exercise combined functions when, and only when, an 
institutionally specialized decision, an exercise of lawmaking through sequenced and 
separated powers, has concluded that they should, and enacted a statute to that effect. 
The  following  sequence  has  occurred  many  times:  Congress  enacts,  the  President 
approves,  and  the  Court  sustains  against  constitutional  challenge  a  statute  that 
delegates sweeping powers to agencies and allows combination of functions -- with 
important limitations and qualifications I will come to in a moment. Where on earth does 
Hamburger think combined agency functions come from? The combination of functions 
in agencies results from the operation of the system of separated legislative, executive 
and judicial powers. Does Hamburger think agencies have awarded such powers to 
themselves, on the basis of some sort of “prerogative”? 
The second problem is that administrative law does not actually allow “agencies” 
to exercise “combined powers.” Hamburger’s repeated implicit claim to that effect is the 
sort of claim that is partly right, partly wrong, and entirely simplistic. What administrative 
law  does  is  to  sometimes,  in  certain  ways  and  through  certain  carefully  specified 
procedures, allows agencies to exercise combined powers. But from reading this book, 
one  would  never  guess  that  administrative  law  spends  as  much  time  limiting  the 
combination of functions as enabling it.  
The scheme of the Administrative Procedure Act is complex and reticulated. Very 
roughly,  it  requires  strict  separation  of  adjudicative  functions  from  prosecutorial  and 
investigative  ones,  in  formal  on-the-record  adjudication  before  an  administrative  law 
judge
94  --  but  not  in  rulemaking,  and  not  at  the  top  level  of  the  agency.  There  are 
separate rules against ex parte contacts in formal adjudication; those rules do apply at 
                                                 
93 See Vermeule, Optimal Abuse of Power, supra note 91 (manuscript at 21). 
94 Hamburger’s treatment of administrative law judges, HAMBURGER, supra note 1, at 337–39, accuses 
them of pervasive institutional bias  –  principally on the basis of a discussion of Montesquieu (!) and 
citations to works from 1903, 1914, and 1927. (He does briefly cite a 2011 textbook as well). All these 
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the top level of the agency. And at any level, due process remains a fallback constraint 
that allows courts to police prejudgment of adjudicative facts, conflicts of interest, or 
other forms of bias. The overall scheme, as Justice Jackson observed in Wong Yang 
Sung v. McGrath,
95 represents a hard-fought compromise.
96 The APA’s approach to 
combination of functions recognizes and trades off both the common-law vision that 
animates Hamburger and also the value of competing goods, such as the activity level 
of agencies, their expertise, and the benefits of a unitary policymaker.
97 
Presumably Hamburger thinks that all this trading-off is a covenant with hell -- 
that the decisions, judicial and legislative and executive, upholding the combination of 
functions  as  a  constitutional  matter  represent  a  betrayal  of  the  Anglo-American 
constitutional order. (Here too, of course, all three branches, exercising their separated 
and specialized powers, have cooperated in setting up the current scheme of partially 
combined  functions.  Is  this  a  betrayal  of  the  separation  of  powers,  or  instead  its 
offspring and fulfillment?) On this view, both the organic statutes that combine functions, 
and even the APA to the extent that it allows and endorses combined functions, are 
unconstitutional, in a small-c sense and probably also a large-C sense.  
Of course I think that isn’t so. But anyone who does think so should at least 
consider and discuss -- shouldn’t they? -- the arguments offered by the architects of the 
combination of functions, by the generations of politicians, officials, lawyers and law 
professors who constructed the system, by the cases that both uphold it and, in various 
ways,  constrain  it.  Here  too,  however,  one  searches  in  vain  for  any  evidence  that 
Hamburger even knows what he is attacking. Where are Chenery II,
98 FTC v. Cement 
Institute,
99 Wong Yang Sung,
100 Marcello v. Bonds,
101 Withrow v. Larkin
102? All of these 
offer arguments, some of great plausibility and sophistication, about the administrative 
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combination of functions, its justification, scope and limits, both under the Constitution 
and under the Administrative Procedure Act. Bizarrely, none of these are to be found in 
the index to the book. It’s as though one tried to launch a deep critique of American-
style  constitutional  judicial  review  without  happening  to  mention  the  line  of  cases 
stemming from Marbury v. Madison. 
 
Conclusion 
  One reaction to Hamburger’s book might be that it is interestingly wrong, in an 
unbalanced sort of way. On that view, the book could be seen as offering a kind of 
constitutional  fiction,  an  oddly  skewed  but  engagingly  dystopian  vision  of  the 
administrative state
103 -- one that illuminates through its very errors and distortions, like 
a caricature,  or  the  works  of  Philip  K.  Dick.  The  book  might  then  be  located  in  the 
stream of legalist-libertarian critique of the administrative state, the line running from 
Dicey, through Hewart and Pound and Hayek, to Richard Epstein. That work is nothing 
if not interesting, if only because it is so hagridden by anxiety about administrative law. 
On further inspection, though, this book is merely disheartening. No, the Federal 
Trade Commission isn’t much like the Star Chamber, after all. It’s irresponsible to go 
about making or necessarily-implying such lurid comparisons, which tend to feed the 
tyrannophobia
104 that bubbles unhealthily around the margins of popular culture, and 
that  surfaces  in  disturbing  forms  on  extremist  blogs,  in  the  darker  corners  of  the 
Internet.  
It’s especially irresponsible to go around saying that the administrative state is 
“unlawful,”  whatever  that  may  mean,  without  understanding  what  administrative  law 
says, and seemingly with little idea about what exactly is being attacked -- little idea 
about  the  intellectual  architecture  that  underpins  administrative  law,  and  that  many 
generations of the legal profession have labored to build up. Trying to tear down the 
intellectual props of the administrative state, without understanding exactly what one is 
tearing  down  or  what  the  consequences  of  doing  so  would  really  be,  is  an  act  of 
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practical interest but no theoretical interest, like a child wrecking a sculpture by Jeff 
Koons. Some admire Koons’s work, some detest it, but the child isn’t in a position to 
understand  why  it  might  be  detestable,  and  the  act  is  purely  destructive,  with  no 
illuminating import. It’s a sign of the times, a portent of the dimming of the legal mind, 
that this book is described in some quarters as “brilliant”
105 and “path-breaking.”
106 It 
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